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SHS article details the major state and federal developments in the
area of criminal pretrial procedure during the Survey period. No one
rase stands out as dramatically as Meshell v. State 1 did in 1987. The
courts, however, 'did issue a number of important decisions this year. A
discussion of the most significant decisions follows.
I. CHARGING INSTRUMENTS
In November of 1985, the Texas voters approved a constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the legislature to establish new rules governing the use of
indictments and informations. 2 Pursuant to the new constitutional provi-
sion, the legislature amended several articles of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. It now appears that the legislature failed to consider a number of
issues when it drafted the constitutional and statutory amendments.
One of the statutory amendments allows the state to amend matters of
form or substance in charging instruments.3 The constitutionality of this
statutory scheme was challenged in Cuesta v. State.4 The appellant in
Cuesta claimed that the statute allowing for the amendment of charging in-
struments is unconstitutional because it violates article II, section 1,5 the
separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution, and article I, sec-
* B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 739 S.W.2d 246, 257-58 (rex. Crim. App. 1987) (Texas Speedy Trial Act held to
violate separation of powers doctrine in the Texas Constitution).
2. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 12(b) (1876, amended 1981, 1985) states:
An indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury
charging a person with the commission of an offense. An information is a writ-
ten instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a per-
son with the commission of an offense. The practice and procedure relating to
the use of indictments and informations, including their contents, amendment,
sufficiency, and requisites, are as provided by law. The presentment of an indict-
ment or information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.
3. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989).
4. 763 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no pet.).
5. TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1 states:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into
three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of
magistracy, to-wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Execu-
tive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or col-
lection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power
properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly
permitted.
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tion 106, the provision of the Texas Constitution addressing the right to
grand jury screening of a criminal offense. The court of appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the statute authorizing the amendment of charging in-
struments,7 but it did not adequately explain its reasoning. In particular, the
court glossed over the fact that a substantive amendment of an indictment
ostensibly denies a defendant the right to have a grand jury make specific
findings in the indictment. Arguably, only an amendment to article I, sec-
tion 10 of the Texas Constitution could authorize such substantive amend-
ments of indictments.
Another statutory amendment enacted by the legislature pursuant to a
constitutional mandate requires a defendant to object, prior to trial, to de-
fects of form or substance in a charging instrument.8 A defendant who fails
to object prior to trial forfeits the right to complain about any such defect.9
The question raised by this statute, as yet unanswered by the court of crimi-
nal appeals, is whether the statute applies to charging instruments that are
insufficient to charge an offense. The Dallas court of appeals says that it
does not. In Murk v. State 10 the Dallas court drew a distinction between
charging instruments that are jurisdictionally defective and charging instru-
ments that simply provide insufficient notice of the offense charged. The
court held that a defect in a charging instrument relating to jurisdictional
requirements cannot be waived.'I An indictment or information that does
not contain all of the elements of an offense is fundamentally defective and
may be challenged at any time. 12
The statutory changes enacted by the legislature forbid the state from
making amendments to a charging instrument that either allege an addi-
tional or different offense from the original instrument or prejudice the sub-
stantial rights of the accused. 13 The questions that arise here are: (1) what
constitutes an additional or different offense and (2) what prejudices the sub-
stantial rights of the accused. Several courts of appeals faced these questions
during the Survey period.
In Byrum v. State 14 the defendant was charged with public lewdness by
engaging in sexual contact with the complainant's "groin area." 15 The trial
court allowed the state to amend the information, over the defendant's objec-
6. TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 10 states in pertinent part:
"[N]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than
in the penitentiary.. .."
7. 763 S.W.2d at 549-50.
8. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
9. Id.
10. 775 S.W.2d 415 (rex.App.-Dallas 1989, pet. granted).
11. Id. at 416.
12. Id
13. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c) (Vernon 1989).
14. 762 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
15. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.07 (Vernon 1989) defines public lewdness in pertinent
part as knowingly engaging in sexual contact in a public place. Sexual contact means any
touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse
or gratifying the sexual desire of any person. I § 21.01 (Vernon 1989).
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tion, and substitute "genitals" for "groin area." The court of appeals stated
that since no Texas statute proscribes sexual contact with a person's "groin
area," the original information did not charge an offense. 16 The court, there-
fore, held that the statutory prohibition against amending an information to
charge a different or additional offense was not violated, since no offense was
alleged in the first place.17
The Beaumont court of appeals also addressed the question of what con-
stitutes a different or additional offense. In Sonnier v. State 18 the defendant
was charged with aggravated robbery. Over the defendant's objection, the
trial court permitted the state to amend the indictment to change the name
of the victim of the robbery. The Beaumont court held that, since the
amended indictment, like the original one, was for aggravated robbery, it did
not charge the defendant with a different offense. 19 In affirming Sonnier's
conviction, the Beaumont court ignored the fact that each time a different
person is robbed a separate offense is committed and thus, by changing the
name of the victim of the robbery, the amended indictment alleged a differ-
ent offense from the original indictment.
Another aspect of the problem of amended charging instruments is the
amount of time given to the defendant to respond to the charges. Pursuant
to article 28.10(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,20 a defendant is enti-
tled to ten days to respond to an amended indictment or information. The
question thus arises as to when this ten days begins. Does it begin when the
state files its motion requesting an amendment and gives notice of such re-
quest to the defendant? Does it begin when the trial court grants the state's
motion? Does the time begin when the charging instrument is physically
changed? According to the Dallas court of appeals, the time begins when
the trial court either signs an order setting out the substance of the amend-
ment or physically changes the charging instrument.21 The defendant must
be specifically informed of the substance of the amendment by the trial
court, rather than by the state's motion to amend, before the ten days to
respond begins to run.
During the last Survey period, the court of criminal appeals held that de-
fendants are entitled to notice when the state intends to seek an affirmative
finding that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon.22 The court
recently loosened this notice requirement in Ex parte Beck.23 In Beck the
court held that any allegation that a death was caused by a named weapon
or instrument necessarily includes an allegation that the named weapon or
instrument is a deadly weapon since that weapon caused a death.24
16. 762 S.W.2d at 690.
17. Id at 690-91.
18. 764 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no pet.).
19. Id. at 351-52.
20. TEx. CODE CaIM. PROc. ANN. art. 28.10(a) (Vernon 1989).
21. Rent v. State, 771 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, pet. granted).
22. Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766, 775 (rex. Crim. App. 1987).
23. 769 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).




Texas courts have long accepted that a defendant does not waive his right
to raise a double jeopardy claim by failing to object at trial or by pleading
guilty to an offense. 25 That is, courts have accepted this argument until now.
In United States v. Broce26 the United States Supreme Court modified this
longstanding rule. The defendant in Broce, after entering guilty pleas to two
separate indictments charging conspiracies in violation of the Sherman Act,
was convicted and sentenced on both indictments. Subsequently, the de-
fendant asked that the second conviction be set aside on double jeopardy
grounds because there was only one conspiracy rather than two. The
Supreme Court held that, by pleading guilty, the defendant relinquished the
right to challenge the government's theory that there were two conspira-
cies.27 Through his pleas, the defendant conceded that he committed two
separate crimes.28 The Supreme Court refused to go behind the face of the
record to determine if the defendant was guilty of one or two conspiracies.
The Supreme Court, however, did leave open the possibility of raising a
double jeopardy challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea if it can be
done on the basis of the existing record without an evidentiary hearing.29
Double jeopardy issues also arise from the interplay between civil and
criminal actions concerning the same event. The United States Supreme
Court considered whether a civil penalty may constitute punishment for pur-
poses of the double jeopardy clause in United States v. Halper.30 The defend-
ant in Halper was convicted of submitting false claims to the government,
sentenced to prison and fined. The government then brought suit against the
defendant seeking up to $130,000.00 in civil penalties for the same conduct.
The Supreme Court held that a civil sanction that does not solely serve a
remedial purpose, but instead serves a retributive or deterrent purpose, is
punishment.31 A civil sanction that is extremely disproportionate to the
government's actual damages is also punishment. 32 As such, a defendant
who has already been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be sub-
jected to an additional civil sanction.33 There is nothing in the double jeop-
ardy clause, however, that prevents the government from bringing a civil suit
in the same proceeding as a criminal suit, nor is there anything that bars a
private individual from suing a person who has already been criminally
punished.34
(allegation that instrument was used in attempt to cause death is sufficient notice that state will
seek affirmative finding that instrument is deadly weapon).
25. Exparte McAfee, 761 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Tinney v. State, 773
S.W.2d 364, 366 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, pet. ref'd).
26. 109 S. Ct. 757, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927 (1989).
27. Id. at 763, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 936-37.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 766, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 939-40.
30. 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989).
31. Id. at 1902, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 502.
32. Id. at 1904, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 504.
33. Id. at 1902, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 502.
34. Id. at 1903, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 503. I
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The United States Supreme Court addressed the former jeopardy issue in
the context of underlying offenses in Jones v. Thomas.35 The defendant was
convicted of felony murder and the underlying felony of attempted robbery.
The lower court sentenced him to serve consecutive sentences on the two
offenses. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the state legislature did not
intend to authorize separate punishments for felony murder and the underly-
ing felony.36 The state court, therefore, vacated the shorter sentence, which
the defendant had served, and credited the time on that sentence against his
remaining sentence. The United States Supreme Court held that the state
court's remedy provided suitable protection for the defendant's double jeop-
ardy rights.37 The Court stated that the double jeopardy clause protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense.38 As long as the defend-
ant's total punishment does not exceed that authorized by the legislature,
this aspect of the double jeopardy clause is not offended. 39
The court of criminal appeals also considered several double jeopardy is-
sues during the Survey period. In Neaves v. State4° the defendant asserted a
plea of collateral estoppel prior to his trial for driving while intoxicated.
Following his arrest for driving while intoxicated, Neaves refused to take a
breath or blood test. At the municipal court hearing, the state attempted to
suspend Neaves' driver's license because of this refusal. 41 The municipal
court refused to suspend the driver's license after finding that there was no
probable cause to arrest Neaves for driving while intoxicated. This finding,
however, did not bar Neaves' subsequent prosecution for driving while in-
toxicated. The court of criminal appeals stated that collateral estoppel bars
the relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact previously determined by a valid
and final judgment between the same parties.42 The court then held that the
question of probable cause to arrest Neaves was not an issue of ultimate fact
in the prosecution for driving while intoxicated.43
Spradling v. State"4 raised the question of whether a person can be
charged with two violations of the failure to stop and render aid statute45 for
striking and killing two pedestrians in one accident and then leaving the
scene. The court of criminal appeals held that the double jeopardy clause
35. 109 S. Ct. 2522, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 322 (1989).
36. Id at 2524, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 329.
37. Id at 2528-29, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 335.
38. Id at 2525, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 331.
39. Id
40. 767 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
41. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f) (Vernon 1989) states that a person's
driver's license shall be suspended if the court finds:
(1) that probable cause existed that such person was driving or in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle on the highway or upon a public beach while
intoxicated, (2) that the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was
offered an opportunity to give a specimen [of blood or breath].. ., and (3) that
such person refused to give a specimen....
Id
42. 767 S.W.2d at 786.
43. Id
44. No. 1031-83 (Tex. Crim. App. June 21, 1989).
45. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701 d, § 38 (Vernon 1977).
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does not bar separate prosecutions for each victim."6 The court's decision
was based on a perceived legislative intent to aid all victims in a hit-and-run
accident and, accordingly, to enforce this intent through appropriate punish-
ment for each victim not so aided.47 In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Clin-
ton pointed out that the defendant was guilty of but a singular volition
omission and should therefore be charged with only one offense.48
III. JOINDER
The Texas Penal Code formerly permitted the joinder of offenses in a sin-
gle charging instrument only when they arose out of the same criminal epi-
sode.49 The code now allows offenses to be joined if they are committed
pursuant to the same transaction, constitute a common scheme or plan, or
are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses.50 The new defi-
nition of criminal episode will probably eliminate most of the errors that
arise in connection with the joinder of offenses. For now, however, the
courts continue to confront joinder issues that arose under the old definition.
In Callins v. State 5 the defendant was convicted of capital murder and
two aggravated robberies. The state joined the three offenses in one indict-
ment. The lower court rendered a single judgment convicting the defendant
of all three offenses. The court of criminal appeals held that it was error to
join all of the offenses in one indictment.5 2 Instead of reversing all three
convictions, however, the court reformed the judgment to delete the two
robbery convictions.5 3 The court then affirmed the capital murder convic-
tion and the resulting death sentence.54
Different joinder rules apply where two separate indictments are consoli-
dated into a single proceeding for trial. A defendant may consent to consoli-
dation of separate indictments either expressly or implicitly, by failure to
object, and consequently authorize a single trial on separate offenses that do
not meet the former definition of criminal episode.55 In such a situation, the
defendant may be convicted and punished separately for each offense.5 6
An unusual joinder problem arose in Washington, v. State.57 In that case,
the appellant complained of the joinder of the offenses of capital murder and
46. No. 1031-83, slip op. at 7.
47. IM
48. Id, slip op. at 12-13 (Clinton, J. dissenting).
49. Former § 3.01 of the Texas Penal Code defined criminal episode as the repeated com-
mission of any one offense found in title 7 of the code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01
(Vernon 1974), amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 387, § 1, 1987 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
50. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
51. No. 69,023 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 1989).
52. Id., slip op. at 2.
53. Id., slip op. at 3. The judgment was reformed pursuant to article 44.24(b) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which authorizes the court of criminal appeals to reform
judgments. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.24(b) (Vernon 1979), repealed by TEX. R.
APP. P. effective Sept. 1, 1986, acts 1985, 65th Leg., Ch. 685, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
54. No. 69,023, slip op. at 24.
55. Milligan v. State, 764 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
56. See Id.
57. 771 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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murder in a single indictment. The court of criminal appeals found no error
in joining the two offenses because the alleged murder was a lesser included
offense of the alleged capital murder.58 The court held that two offenses may
be joined in a single indictment where one offense is a lesser included of-
fenses of the other, even if the two offenses do not meet the former definition
of criminal episode. 59
IV. SEVERANCE
The court of criminal appeals, in Webb v. State,6° considered the circum-
stances under which evidence of and comment on a defendant's post-arrest
silence by a co-defendant's attorney should result in separate trials for the
co-defendants. According to the court, separate trials are required only
when one defendant has the right to comment on the silence of a co-defend-
ant and the co-defendant is entitled to be free of such comment.61 The court
held that separate trials were not required in Webb because the attorney who
commented on Webb's silence had no right to make the comment. 62 In-
stead, the trial judge should have excluded the attorney's comment. 63
The Code of Criminal Procedure allows co-defendants who have been
granted a severance to agree upon the order in which they will be tried.64 In
Roberts v. &ate6s the trial court granted a severance and ordered three co-
defendants tried separately. The co-defendants then filed an agreed order of
trial stating that Roberts should be tried last. The trial court refused to
follow the agreement because Roberts was in jail and the other two co-de-
fendants were on bond. Roberts, therefore, was tried first over his objection.
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred, although it also held that
the error was harmless. 66 An important factor in finding the error harmless
was the fact that one of Roberts' co-defendants testified for him at his trial
without asserting his right against self-incrimination. 67
V. GRAND JURY
The 71st Legislature made several amendments to the statutes governing
grand jury procedures. One potentially important change authorizes the at-
58. Id. at 546.
59. Id
60. 763 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
61. Id at 775. It does not matter that a defense attorney rather than the prosecutor
commented on the silence of another defendant, under Texas law, the comments are treated
the same regardless of their source. IM.
62. Id at 775-76.
63. Id at 775. The court does not explain why the comment was impermissible. From
the opinion, the evidence appears to have been introduced and commented on in an effort to
obtain a more lenient penalty because the commenter's client and not the codefendants cooper-
ated with the police. It would seem to be entirely permissible to contrast co-defendants for
punishment purposes by commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence and lack of
cooperation.
64. TEx. CODE CMM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.10 (Vernon 1981).
65. 762 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, pet. granted).
66. Id. at 709-10.
67. Id at 710.
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torney for the accused, if approved by the prosecutor, to address the grand
jury.68 Prosecutors should act out of fairness and approve reasonable re-
quests from defense attorneys to address the grand jury. Another amend-
ment requires the state to furnish defendants with a written copy of the
warnings required by the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to their testify-
ing before the grand jury.69 Legislation now also forbids close relatives from
serving on the same grand jury.70
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently addressed the issue of
grand jury selection in Gentry v. State.71 The defendant in Gentry moved to
quash his indictment because the commissioners who selected the grand jury
that indicted Gentry were not from different portions of Denton County.
Four of the five grand jury commissioners were from the City of Denton.
The court of criminal appeals held that the language in the Code of Criminal
Procedure 72 that requires grand jury commissioners to be selected from dif-
ferent portions of the county is directory rather than mandatory. 73 Further,
because the record did not reflect the proportion of residents of Denton
County who lived in the City of Denton, the court held that there was suffi-
68. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20.04 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
69. TEx. CODE CalM. PROC. ANN. art. 20.17 (Vernon Supp. 1990) provides:
(a) The grand jury, in propounding questions to the person accused or sus-
pect, shall first state the offense with which he is suspected or accused, the
county where the offense is said to have been committed and as nearly as may
be, the time of commission of the offense, and shall direct the examination to the
offense under investigation.
(b) Prior to any questioning of an accused or suspected person who is sub-
poenaed to appear before the grand jury, the accused or suspected person shall
be furnished a written copy of the warnings contained in Subsection (c) of this
section and shall be given a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel or apply to
the court for an appointed attorney and to consult with counsel prior to appear-
ing before the grand jury.
(c) If an accused or suspected person is subpoenaed to appear before a grand
jury prior to any questions before the grand jury, the person accused or sus-
pected shall be orally warned as follows:
(1) "Your testimony before this grand jury is under oath";
(2) "Any material question that is answered falsely before this grand jury sub-
jects you to being prosecuted for aggravated perjury";
(3) "You have the right to refuse to make answers to any question, the answer
to which would incriminate you in any manner";
(4) "You have the right to have a lawyer present outside this chamber to ad-
vise you before making answers to questions you feel might incriminate
you";
(5) "Any testimony you give may be used against you at any subsequent
proceeding";
(6) "If you are unable to employ a lawyer, you have the right to have a lawyer
appointed to advise you before making an answer to a question, the answer
to which you feel might incriminate you."
70. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 19.08(6) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
71. 770 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
72. Tex. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 19.01(a)(4) (Vernon 1989) provides in pertinent
part: "(a) The district judge, at or during the term of court, shall appoint not less than three,
nor more than five persons to perform the duties of jury commissioners. . ., and they shall
possess the following qualifications:.... 4. Be residents of different portions of the county."
73. 770 S.W.2d at 793-94.
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cient compliance with the statute. 74
VI. SPEEDY TRIAL
In Stewart v. State" the grand jury no-billed a defendant, Stewart, ar-
rested for murder and he was released from custody. Seven years later, a
new witness came forward and the state indicted Stewart. Seven months
after that indictment, Stewart was tried and convicted. On appeal, Stewart
complained that the seven year delay violated his right to a speedy trial. The
Dallas court of appeals disagreed and affirmed Stewart's conviction.7 6 The
court stated that the right to a speedy trial attaches from the time that the
indictment is presented and, therefore, the seven month delay from indict-
ment to trial did not violate Stewart's right to a speedy trial. 77
VII. VENUE
In Johnson v. State 78 the court of criminal appeals made it clear that the
standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a change of venue
is abuse of discretion.79 Whether the trial court abused its discretion must
be determined in light of whether outside influences affecting the community
climate concerning the defendant were inherently suspect.8 0 Publicity alone
is not a sufficient reason to change venue."' Johnson's death sentence was
affirmed because the evidence was not sufficient to show that such a perva-
sive feeling existed in the community as to preclude the movant from receiv-
ing a fair trial by an impartial jury.82
The court of criminal appeals affirmed two other death sentences during
the Survey period because of the failure of appellants to establish an abuse of
discretion in the denial of motions for a change of venue.8 3 The court of
criminal appeals continues to make it exceedingly difficult to obtain a change
of venue based on publicity alone. The best hope that a defendant has for
obtaining a change of venue appears to be by paying strict attention to the
statutory requirements concerning change of venue motions.8 4 Yet, even in
this area, defendants often fail due to their own negligence. For example, in
McGee v. State8 5 the defendant filed a proper motion for change of venue in
compliance with the statutory requirements. The state did not file any con-
troverting affidavits. The defendant then waived his right to a change of
74. Id at 794.
75. 767 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.-App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.).
76. Id at 456.
77. Id at 457; accord Spence v. State, 758 S.W.2d 597, 598 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(pre-accusational delay does not trigger constitutional speedy trial protections).
78. No. 69,750 (rex. Crim. App. June 21, 1989).
79. Id slip op. at 2.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id, slip op. at 3.
83. McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 242 (rex. Crim. App. 1989); Beets v. State, 767
S.W.2d 711, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
84. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 31.03, 31.04 (Vernon 1989).
85. 774 S.W.2d 229 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
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venue, as a matter of law, by proceeding to a hearing on his motion for a
change of venue instead of simply relying on his motion and objecting to any
hearing on the motion.86 The defendant then lost his request for a change of
venue because he failed to establish in the hearing that prejudice in the com-
munity made the likelihood of obtaining a fair and impartial jury doubtful.87
In Wyle v. State 88 the defendant tried to meet the heavy burden of show-
ing the extent of prejudice against him in the community by retaining a poll-
ster to prepare a statistical survey. The court of criminal appeals stated that
a survey prepared by a pollster would arguably be admissible on a motion
for a change of venue. 89 The court held, however, that there was no require-
ment that the expense of a pollster be paid for by the state.9"
VIII. BAIL
Article 1, section 1 l(a) of the Texas Constitution9' allows a defendant to
be held in custody, without bail, if he is accused of a committing a felony
while on bail for a prior felony indictment. A court must issue an order
denying bail within seven days of the defendant's arrest on the second
felony.92
The Court of Criminal Appeals considered the question of what consti-
tutes the "issuance" of an order in Westbrook v. State.93 The state in West-
brook timely filed a motion to hold the defendant in jail without bond
following his arrest for a felony committed while he was free on an appeal
bond for another offense. The trial court held a hearing on that motion and
orally granted the state's motion to deny bail. The court's order, however,
was never reduced to writing. The court of criminal appeals held that an
order denying bail must be in writing and must be issued within seven days
of arrest.94 An oral order denying bail cannot be issued in the constitutional
sense.95 The court of criminal appeals remanded the case to the trial court
to set bail.96
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a defendant who is de-
tained in jail more than 90 days pending trial of a felony offense be released
from custody either on a personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail
required. 97 The statute containing this requirement was enacted as part of
the Speedy Trial Act and appellate courts are grappling with its applica-
86. Id. at 241.
87. Id. at 242; accord McNiel v. State, 757 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
88. No. 69,295 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1989).
89. Id., slip op. at 6.
90. Id
91. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 11(a) (1956, amended 1977).
92. Id
93. 753 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
94. Id. at 159.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 160.
97. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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tion.98 That act was declared unconstitutional in Meshell v. State.99 The
Austin court of appeals, therefore, held the provisions of the Speedy Trial
Act dealing with bail to be void.1°° The Austin court differed with the Tyler
court of appeals on the continued viability of the bail provisions of the
Speedy Trial Act. 0 1 The Houston first district court of appeals refused to
consider the constitutionality of the bail provisions of the Speedy Trial Act
because the question of the constitutionality had not been raised in the trial
court. 102 On the other hand, the Fort Worth court of appeals considered the
merits of a request under this statute for a personal bond or a reduction in
the amount of bail without ever commenting on the constitutionality of the
statute. 103 It thus appears that the court of criminal appeals needs to clear
up the confusion in this area.
X. CONTINUANCE
In Gentry v. State 10 4 the defendant was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. During the course of his trial, Gentry orally sought a
continuance because a witness that he desired to have testify for him was
unavailable. The court of criminal appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to
grant a continuance.10 5 The court based its holding on three reasons. First,
the defendant did not file a written, sworn motion for continuance.1° 6 Sec-
ond, Gentry did not show that he acted diligently in attempting to obtain the
witness' presence in court.10 7 Third, he did not prove that the expected testi-
mony of the absent witness would have been material.' 08
While Gentry illustrates the need for defendants to strictly comply with
statutory requirements when requesting continuances, Beebe v. State"'9
shows the need for trial courts to strictly comply with statutory require-
ments as well. In Beebe the defendant requested additional time to prepare
for trial following the amendment of the information. The trial court denied
98. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 32a.01-.02 (Vernon 1989).
99. 739 S.W.2d 246, 248 (rex. Crim. App. 1987).
100. Ex parte Danziger, 775 S.W.2d 475, 476 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, pet granted).
101. Ex parte Delk, 750 S.W.2d 816, 817 (rex. App.-Tyler 1988, no pet.).
102. Ex parte McNeil, 772 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no
pet.).
103. Balawajder v. State, 759 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd).
104. 770 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
105. Id at 786.
106. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 29.03 (Vernon 1989) (criminal action may
be continued on written motion of defendant); TEX. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art. 29.08
(Vernon 1989). "[A]lU motions for continuance must be sworn to by a person having personal
knowledge of the facts relied on for the continuance." Tnx. CODE CilM. PROC. ANN. art.
29.08 (Vernon 1989).
107. 770 S.W.2d at 787 (Gentry claimed diligence because of his reliance on the State's
subpoena of the witness. The court of criminal appeals found no diligence. Gentry's trial was
continued to a date beyond the date on which the witness was instructed to appear; Gentry,
therefore, should have issued a new subpoena for the witness).
108. Id The mate riality of the testimony of the missing witness can be established by a
sworn affidavit from the missing witness or through some other showing, under oath, of the
expected testimony. Id
109. 756 S.W.2d 759 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, pet. granted).
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the defendant's request although the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates
that a defendant, upon request, be given ten days to respond to an amended
information."10 The court of appeals held that refusal to give the defendant
ten days to prepare for trial was reversible error, even without a showing of
harm or prejudice on the part of the defendant."1'
XI. DISCOVERY
In Arizona v. Youngblood 112 the United States Supreme Court held that
the failure of the state to preserve potentially useful evidentiary material
does not constitute a denial of due process. Youngblood was charged with
the sexual assault of a child. He argued at trial that the victim erred in
identifying him as his attacker. While investigating this offense, the police
gathered semen samples from the child victim's body and clothing using a
sexual assault kit. The state conducted certain laboratory tests on these sam-
ples that proved to be inconclusive. The state gave Youngblood access to the
lab results and all of the police reports. The state, however, did not preserve
the evidentiary material in such a way that additional tests could be per-
formed on the material. Youngblood, therefore, lost an opportunity to
demonstrate scientifically that he was not the person who assaulted the
child.
The Supreme Court wrote that the due process clause makes the good
faith or bad faith of the state irrelevant when the state fails to disclose mate-
rial exculpatory evidence.1 13 According to the Court, however, a different
result is called for when the state fails to preserve evidentiary material of
which no more can be said than that the material could have been subjected
to tests that might have exonerated the defendant." 4 Unless the defendant
can show bad faith on the part of the police, the failure to preserve poten-
tially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law."s
Further, the state has no constitutional duty to perform certain tests on
physical evidence.16
The Fifth Circuit, in a case discussed in the last Survey, 117 Garrett Y.
Lynaugh,"18 reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in Young-
blood. It thus appears that the courts will not get involved in directing the
manner in which law enforcement authorities investigate a crime. There is
apparently a willingness to sacrifice accuracy in the truth seeking functions
110. TEx. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(a) (Vernon 1989) reads in pertinent parts as
follows: "On the request of the defendant, the court shall allow the defendant not less than 10
days, or a shorter period if requested by the defendant, to respond to the amended indictment
or information."
111. 756 S.W.2d at 761.
112. 109 S. Ct. 333, 337, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 289 (1988).
113. Id., 102 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
114. Id, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
115. Id , 102 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
116. Id at 338, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 290.
117. Udashen, Criminal Procedure: Pretrial, Annual Survey of Texas Law 43 Sw. L.J. 535,
543 (1989).
118. 842 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1988).
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of a trial for the expedient and politically popular goal of arresting and con-
victing criminals.
XII. COMPETENCY
In Manning v. State 119 the Dallas court of appeals considered the role of
the attorney-client privilege in a competency hearing. Manning was tried
and convicted of murder, attempted murder and three counts of aggravated
robbery. Manning raised the issue of his competency to stand trial at a hear-
ing prior to trial. On appeal, Manning claimed that the trial court commit-
ted error at his competency hearing. The court of criminal appeals agreed
and remanded Manning's case to the trial court for a new competency hear-
ing. 120 New counsel represented Manning at his second competency hear-
ing. Manning's attorney from the previous trial on the merits testified at the
second competency hearing that Manning had a rational, as well as a factual,
understanding of the proceedings against him during his trial. In a case of
first impression, Manning claimed that his former attorney's testimony vio-
lated the attorney-client privilege.
Manning's argument was based on that portion of rule 503 of the Rules of
Criminal Evidence that prevents a lawyer from disclosing any fact which
came to the lawyer's knowledge by reason of the attorney-client relation-
ship.'21 This aspect of the rule is broader than the traditional notion of the
attorney-client privilege that simply prevents an attorney from revealing
confidential communications with his client. Manning, therefore, argued
that his attorney would not have been in a position to express an opinion
concerning his competency if there had not been an attorney-client relation-
ship. The court, however, disagreed and held that the testimony of Man-
ning's attorney did not violate the attorney-client privilege.122 The court
reasoned that because of the nonadversarial nature of competency hearings
and because of the constitutional implications of the competency inquiry, the
testimony of a defendant's attorney during a competency hearing is appro-
priate as long as confidential communications. are not revealed.123
119. 766 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989), aff'd, 773 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989) (en banc).
120. Manning v. State, 730 S.W.2d 744 (rex. Crim. App. 1987).
121. TEx. P_ CPJM. EVID. 503(b).
122. 766 S.W.2d at 558.
123. Id
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